

CIA Suggested  
Agenda

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1 May 1979

SUBJECT: Suggested Agenda and Discussion Points for the SCC Meeting  
on Middle East Security

Threats are varied:

1. External threats to friendly regional states by conventional forces supported by the Soviets or Soviet surrogates.
2. Subversion by radical regional states or groups, directly or through opposition movements.
3. Internal upheaval caused by political/social ferment or religious elements with little or no external assistance.

Responses must correspond to threats:

1. The military response is suited mainly to the first threat, which is the least likely to occur on a broad scale. To counter it, friendly regional states will favor a series of bilateral and multilateral security arrangements based on upgrading military and security capability, a flexible arms and training policy, and a regional response capability by the US. An awareness that the USG is prepared to stand by its friends could be enhanced by statements, etc.

- The area states are unlikely to desire formal security arrangements, such as CENTO, because they desire to preserve their non-aligned credentials and because they do not want the issue dragged through Congress and the US press. They will want ad hoc meetings to discuss clearly defined threats and security requirements.
- There will be an initial reluctance to have these discussions take on a multilateral character. If requested, however, the states will probably approve our informing other states that we are talking in similar terms to other states and encourage these states to talk to each other. When similarities in threats and requirements become known, multilateral discussions may evolve.

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- It will be necessary to determine on a regional basis what degree of US presence the traffic can bear. It will be damaging, for instance, to accept base rights in one willing state when most of our other friends find this inconvenient.
- Arms policy will need to be more flexible, but also to encourage a reasonable distribution of weapon types that would lead to integration rather than competition, with a high degree of transport capability. In this way the message of cooperation is likely to get through.
- Our presence would probably be more acceptable over the horizon, if our commitment is clear.

2. The second threat is heightened by the Arab-Israeli issue and the tensions resulting from the Camp David Accords. It can be dealt with to a limited extent by means of some of the activities outlined in paragraph 1. More important, however, are steps to minimize area radicalization by resolving the basic issues and to encourage moderates to enter into dialogues about mutual problems and concerns.

- Political institutions in each state will develop unevenly.



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- States should not be pressed to take stands that would make them the targets of their neighbors.
- More effective intelligence services should be created and the exchange of intelligence on areas of mutual concern (PDY) among states should be encouraged.

3. The third threat is the most difficult to deal with. The need is to encourage the evolution of social change at a speed appropriate to each nation and the region. Utilizing the insights and lessons learned from Iran and recognizing that the Iranian experience has given us a fertile audience, the need is for a diplomacy that is instructive but not "preachy"; using a partnership approach, where parties feel free to discuss each other's perceived problem areas. This may entail the use of a special envoy.

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-- At this critical time it would be a mistake to feel constrained in our dialogues with friends. The need is to be prepared to speak frankly and be spoken to frankly on a full range of political, social, and economic issues. Because this could go beyond the bounds of normal diplomatic practice, special envoys should be sent.

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